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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Retroactivity of Constitutional Decisions
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. Cali-
fornia,' held that comment by the prosecutor or judge on the ac-
cused's silence at a state trial is violative of the fifth amendment as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. In 1966,
in Tehan v. United States,2 the Court held that this no-comment
rule would not be applied retroactively to judgments that became
final prior to the 1965 opinion. How then do we reconcile the
application of one constitutional principle to pre-1965 criminal judg-
ments with the application of a different constitutional principle to
post-1965 judgments?
Under the common-law view, the question of whether to apply
a new judicial decision retroactively did not arise. The judge's role
was merely to declare the law, not to change it. If a prior decision
mistakenly declared the law, then a subsequent overruling decision
declared it to be no law.' Consequently, under this "declaratory
theory" the law remained constant; any overruling decision was, of
necessity, applied retroactively.
The inequities arising from strict adherence to the declaratory
theory led to several exceptions to the rule, especially where prospec-
tive limitation was deemed necessary to do fairness to a party.
4
With general acceptance of the view that the court has discretion
to determine whether an overruling decision should operate retro-
actively or be limited prospectively,' the problem has become one of
line-drawing rather than one of across-the-board adoption of any
one theory.' The same development is also evident in decisions hold-
1380 U.S. 609 (1965).
* _ U.S.-, 86 Sup. Ct. 459 (1966).
"For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or
unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was
not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has
been erroneously determined." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 70.
'See Note, 43 VA. L. REv. 1279, 1281, 1290 (1957).
' This is a case where a court has refused to make its ruling retroac-
tive, and the novel stand is taken that the constitution of the United
States is infringed by the refusal. We think the federal constitution
has no voice upon the subject. A state in defining the limits of ad-
herence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the princi-
ple of forward operation and that of relation backward.
Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).




However, there seems to have been an implied adoption of the
declaratory theory when the overruling decision expanded constitu-
tional protections accorded the criminally accused, i.e., when fairness
to a party seemed to support retroactive application. This implied
adoption resulted from a refusal by the Court to face squarely the
issue.8
In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.,' in 1958, the Court, in
a per curiam decision, applied the rule that indigents on appeal must
be provided transcripts ° to a 1935 case with no discussion of the
retroactivity issue.
Again, in Norvell v. Illinois," the Court side-stepped the prob-
tutes judicial legislation. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213,
224-25 (1960) (separate opinion of Black, J.).
" Compare, Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886), with Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). In
Norton, it was stated:
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Norton v. Shelby County, supra at 442.
In Chicot County the same question was discussed as follows:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, [of
unconstitutionality] is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. . . . Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the nature both of the statute and its previous application, demand
examination.
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, supra at 374.
'Individual justices had foreseen the retroactivity problems in this area
and had urged the Court to take a stand. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), which declared that due process required making necessary tran-
scripts available to indigents on appeal, Justice Frankfurter spoke for express
consideration of the issue as follows:
The Court ought neither to rely on casuistic arguments in denying
constitutional claims, nor deem itself imprisoned within a formal,
abstract dilemma. The judicial choice is not limited to a new ruling
necessarily retrospective, or to rejection of what the requirements of
equal protection of the laws, as now perceived, require. For sound
reasons, law generally speaks prospectively.... In arriving at a new
principle, the judicial process is not impotent to define its scope and
limits. . . . We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now
announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did
not avail themselves of it waived their rights. It is much more con-
ducive to law's self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations,
that give prospective content to a new pronouncement of law.
Griffin v. Illinois, supra at 25-26.
357 U.S. 214 (1958).
10 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
11373 U.S. 420 (1963).
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lem. Following Griffin v. Illinois, in which the Court declared that
due process required making necessary transcripts available to in-
digents on appeal, Illinois had, by statute, provided for free tran-
scripts to all indigents convicted prior to or after Griffin, but granted
the court authority to deny a petition for transcripts if the court
reporter be dead or unable to furnish the record. Norvell had been
convicted in 1941 and, because he could not afford transcripts, failed
to pursue an appeal. In 1956 he requested transcripts and was re-
fused because the reporter had died. No one could read the re-
porter's shorthand notes, and the trial testimony could not otherwise
be reconstructed. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of a new trial on the ground that Norvell had a lawyer at
the trial and failed to pursue his remedy at that time. This un-
reasoned modification of what had been done summarily in Esk-
ridge was attacked by Justices Goldberg and Stewart in a vigorous
dissent.
Griffin was a constitutional decision vindicating basic Fourteenth
Amendment rights and is no more to be restricted in scope or
application in time than other constitutional judgments. This,
it seems to me, is the clear import of this Court's decision in
Eskridge v. Washington .... 12
An opportunity to meet the retroactivity question was again
avoided in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright,3 where the Court summarily
applied with no discussion, Gideon v. Wainwright"4 retroactively.
This remained the situation until a decison finally spoke to the
issue and established the framework within which subsequent argu-
ments for retroactivity in this field are to be evaluated. The decision
in Linkletter v. Walker;1r5 it held that the Mapp v. Ohio'G exclu-
sionary rule would not be applied retroactivelyY7
After noting that "heretofore, without discussion, we have ap-
"Id. at 425 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
13375 U.S. 2 (1963). Justice Harlan dissented in Pickelsimer on the
ground that the Court should address itself expressly to the problem of
retroactivity.
1' 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent's right to counsel declared).
10381 U.S. 618 (1965).
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding illegally-seized evidence not admissible
at trial).
" It should be noted that the exclusionary rule was not limited to com-
plete prospective application; it was applied to the Mapp case itself as well
as to all cases pending on appeal at the time Mapp was decided.
1098 [Vol. 44
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plied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulga-
tion of the rule,"' 8 the Court proceeded to enumerate the factors
upon which it was now going to base its line drawing.
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to
apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively,
we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each case by look-
ing to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation. 19
The main thrust of the opinion seems to have centered on the
purpose argument. Viewed on this level, the exclusionary rule is
necessary merely as an effective deterrent to illegal police action.
Consequently, retroactive application of the rule would not serve
to further the purpose of the rule, nor could it restore "the ruptured
privacy of the victims' homes and effects."2
Continuing this pragmatic approach, the Court noted the terrible
impact retroactive application would have upon the judicial ma-
chinery. The Court's concern for the problems inherent in new
trials in which witnesses and evidence may be unavailable and with
the increased burden upon trial dockets seems reminiscent of the
Norvell result. However, the Court apparently incorporated an ad-
ditional factor into its administration of justice argument, i.e., the
fact that in Linkletter "there is no likelihood of unreliability or coer-
cion present .. .""' The Court's statement that "to thus legitimate
such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on
guilt would seriously disrupt the administration of justice"2 2 would
seem to imply that if the procedure had a "bearing on guilt," the
administration of justice would not be deemed disrupted by retro-
active application. The net result seems to be that hardship on the
judiciary becomes a relevant argument for prospective limitation
only if it is first determined that the newly announced constitutional
" 381 U.S. at 628.
10 Id. at 629.
20 Id. at 637.
" Id. at 638. This emphasis on the reliability of the guilt-determining
process seems also to have played an important part, independent of the other
criteria, in providing a ground for distinguishing the Gideon and Griffin
line of cases, which had applied new rules retroactively in situations where
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principle has no bearing on the reliability of the guilt-determining
process. Such a distinction seems very dubious.m
Finally, the Court gave some credence to the fact that the states
had relied upon the Wolf v. Colorado24 decision holding the exclu-
sionary rule was not required by the fourteenth amendment. In
speaking of the states' "vested interest" in sustaining prior decisions,
the Court relied upon cases involving individual interests, 25 even
though it would seem very difficult to view the states as having a
vested interest in keeping a man incarcerated.
Justice Black's dissent in Linkletter warrants mention here be-
cause it was adopted by him in Tehan. In attacking what he con-
sidered to be discrimination against Linkletter solely because his
trial proceeded more swiftly than did Miss Mapp's, Justice Black
noted his failure to understand "why those who suffer from the
use of evidence secured by a search and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment should be treated differently from those who
have been denied other guarantees of the Bill of Rights."2" In
attacking the purpose argument, he noted that the exclusionary rule
is more than a mere punishment against police officers ;27 it is also
a right accorded the accused,2 8 a right that the Mapp decision itself
"8 Gideon itself did not rely upon any showing of prejudice resulting
from the denial of counsel. Currier, Tivie and Change in Judge-Made
Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 270 (1965). Unfortu-
nately, the Court seems to have equated "fairness of trial" with the reli-
ability of the guilt-determining process. It stated: "Finally, in each of the
- areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively the principle
that we applied went to the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the
fact-finding process." 381 U.S. at 639.
24338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"5See 381 U.S. at 627.
" Id. at 646. In support of his position that there should be no such
distinction, justice Black relied upon the following language from Mapp:
[W]e can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other
basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer
permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the
name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
"7 The inference I gather from these repeated statements is that the
rule is not a right or privilege accorded to defendants charged with
crime but is a sort of punishment against officers in order to keep
them from depriving people of their constitutional rights. In passing
I would say that if that is the sole purpose, reason, object and effect
of the rule, the court's action in adopting it sounds more like law-
making than construing the Constitution.
381 U.S. at 649.
8 This was the position taken by the Ninth Circuit.
1100 [Vol. 44
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had recognized might lead to the release of some criminals. 9 On
the increased burden retroactive application might place upon the
judicial system, Justice Black merely stated his view that the argu-
ment is no more applicable to Linkletter than it was in the decisions
growing out of Gideon and Griffin v. Illinois. In conclusion, Justice
Black addressed himself to the reliance argument as follows:
No State should be considered to have a vested interest in keep-
ing prisoners in jail who were convicted because of lawless con-
duct by the State's officials. Careful analysis of the Court's
opinion shows that it rests on the premise that a State's assumed
interest in sustaining convictions obtained under the old repudi-
ated rule outweighs the interests both of that State and of the
individuals convicted in having wrongful convictions set aside.30
Notwithstanding these objections, 1 the majority opinion in
Linkletter seems to establish the following criteria for determina-
tion of retroactivity.
(1) Line drawing will be applied on the question of retroactivity
to decisions broadening the constitutional rights of criminal defen-
dants.
(2) The relevant factors to be considered in drawing the line
are the degree of state reliance upon the prior rule, the purpose of
the newly announced rule, the effect retroactive application would
have upon the attainment of this purpose and the effect of retro-
activity upon the efficient administration of justice.
(3) If the new rule does not go to the "fairness of the trial-
We agree that the underlying policy objective of the doctrine of ex-
clusion is to deter. The doctrine of exclusion is nevertheless a Con-
stitutional privilege of the victim, and its status as such is not altered
by identification of its purpose.
California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 1963).
" "In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result .... The criminal
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can de-
stroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
30 381 U.S. at 652-53.
"An additional objection has been voiced by some commentators that
the retroactivity problem is an "illusion." Relying upon the language of
the federal habeas corpus statute that the writ is available to state prisoners
who are "in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States,"
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3), these writers argue that the petition puts in issue
only present confinement under present standards and that the legality of
the initial incarceration is in no way relevant. See United States v. Fay,
333 F.2d 12, 25 (2d Cir. 1964) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Meador, Habeas
Corpas and The "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1964).
1966]
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the very integrity of the fact-finding process,"8 2 then it seems that
it will not be applied retroactively.
Putting aside the propriety of the Linkletter rule, was it, as
announced, properly applied in the Tehan situation?
In Twining v. New Jersey,3' it was held that the federal consti-
tution did not require the states to accord criminal defendants the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Then, in 1963,
over fifty years later, Twining was overruled, and it was held that
the privilege against self-incrimination is protected by the four-
teenth amendment against abridgment by the states.3 4 Two years
later, Griffin v. California3 5 held that the fifth amendment forbade
comment on the accused's silence.
Griffin is important to the analysis of Tehan for its statement
of the basis upon which the no-comment rule is established. The
Court seems to have made it clear that allowing comment had a
direct bearing upon the integrity of the guilt-determining process.
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand,
though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive
timidity,. nervousness when facing others and attempting to ex-
plain transactions of a suspicious character and offenses charged
against him will often confuse and embarrass him to such a de-
gree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him.
It is not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, will-
ingly be placed on the witness stand.36
The Court in Griffin also viewed the comment rule as a "remnant
of the 'inquisitorial system,' ",17 and as an attempt, while recogniz-
ing the accused's privilege against self-incrimination with one
breath, to penalize its assertion with the next. 8
The Court in Tehan was quick to note these multi-purposes of
2 381 U.S. at 639.
--211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
*"380 U.S. 609 (1965).
8 Id. at 613.
87 Id. at 614. The Court disposed of the argument that the jury will
infer guilt from silence even though no comment be allowed as follows:
"What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence against him is quite another." Ibid.
"8 "It [comment] is a penalty imposed by the courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly." Ibid.
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the rule against compulsory self-incrimination. 9 Equally swiftly,
it identified the "basic purpose" behind the privilege to be the pres-
ervation of the accusatorial system, stating that the basic purposes
of the privilege "do not relate to protecting the innocent from con-
viction."40 Then, by what appears to be somewhat doubtful reason-
ing, the Court stated that since all the states had granted the
testimonial privilege against self-incrimination prior to Griffin, any
variations in the application of the privilege "did not go to the basic
purposes of the federal privilege."'i Finally, the Court stated that
as the privilege related to "our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality,"42 retroactive application could not remedy the
already consummated intrusion. Thus, since the privilege is "not
an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth,"4 3 but merely represents
values reflecting our concern for the "right of each individual to
be let alone," 44 the Court apparently viewed itself as clearly within
the Linkletter rationale.
4 5
" The Court, in a footnote, quoted at length from a 1964 opinion written
by Justice Goldberg:
It [privilege against self-incrimination] reflects many of our funda-
mental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incrimi-
nating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses;
our sense of fair play . . . ; our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life," . . . ; our distrust of self-
deprecating statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
0Tehan v. United States, - U.S. -, 86 Sup. Ct. 459, 464 (1966).
"Ibid. But see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965), where
it is stated: "For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,' . . . which the Fifth Amendment
outlaws."
4Tehan v. United States, - U.S. - , 86 Sup. Ct. 459, 465 (1966).
'8 Ibid.
"Ibid.
The impact of retroactive application upon the administration of justice
in those states that had relied upon Twining v. New Jersey, apparently six
in number in 1960, was felt to be "so devastating as to need no elaboration."
U.S. - , 86 Sup. Ct. at 467. It should be noted, however, that in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), five justices felt that the fifth
amendment forbade comment; but, Justice Frankfurter believed the fifth
not applicable to the states through the fourteenth and thus made the
majority for holding the comment practice constitutional. Consequently, re-
liance upon Twining would appear, at least no more warranted than was
the reliance upon Wolf v. Colorado.
196] 1103
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That which Linkletter implied, Tehan has apparently confirmed,
i.e., the approach to retroactivity in decisions expanding the consti-
tutional rights of the criminally accused is to be pragmatic with
emphasis on the practical reverberations in light of the one domi-
nant objective sought by the new rule. Such an approach, at least
in the Tehan situation, does not seem appropriate.
The mere fact that the declaratory theory has been discarded
would not seem adequate reason for completely ignoring one of the
apparent considerations behind the rule. Professor Mishkin has ex-
pressed the role of the declaratory theory as follows:
[T]he 'declaratory theory' expresses a symbolic concept of the
judicial process on which much of courts' prestige and power
depend. This is the strongly held and deeply felt belief that
judges are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law, that they
apply that law impersonally as well as impartially, that they exer-
cise no individual choice and have no program of their own to
advance.... [T]his symbolic view of courts is a major factor in
securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial decisions. If the
view be in part myth, it is a myth by which we live and which
can be sacrificed only at substantial cost; consider, for example,
the loss involved if judges could not appeal to the idea that is 'the
law' or 'the Constitution'-and not they personally-who com-
mand a given result.
46
It would seem that when constitutional rights are in issue-
when the rights in issue are pregnant with the ethical judgments
that are involved in due process and fair trial discussions-the
appropriateness of this declaratory theory concept is strengthened.41
Society, with its sense of the eternalness and all-inclusiveness of
ethical judgments, is likely to view any overruling decision as an
admission of past error, rather than as a creative exercise of the
judicial power to adopt to changed conditions 4s--that which is due
process for Mr. Griffin should also be due process for Mr. Tehan.
Consequently, the values of equality of treatment and the image of
justice, if not controlling in such situations, merit, it would seem,
at least some recognition by the Court in its line-drawing exercise.40
" Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and The Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 62 (1965).
" See Comment, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 587 (1962).
"8 Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Over-
ruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 257 (1965).
' See Ibid.
[Vol. 441104
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Considerations of stability, reliance and the efficiency of the admin-
istration of justice seem insufficient in themselves to support arbi-
trarily drawing a line between cases pending and those finally
decided.5
Nevertheless, it might be argued that the Linkletter result is
supportable upon the policy for finality of judgments as it reflects
concern for the efficient administration of justice. Thus, retro-
activity would be applied only when the new constitutional standard
was intended to improve the reliability of the guilt-determining
process.5 Since the exclusionary rule was deemed to be not so
conceived, the refusal to allow collateral attack on the prior judg-
ment through habeas corpus is, it is argued, justified.52
Assuming that this rationale is that which was intended by the
purpose and judicial administration arguments of Linkletter, the
standard still seems improperly applied in Tehan. By construing
"purpose" to mean "dominant objective," the Court, in Tehan, ap-
parently ignored the Griffin statements that the no-comment rule
did serve, among other purposes, to assure the reliability of the
guilt-determining process. 53 Where Linkletter had drawn a distinc-
tion between the right to counsel and the right to be protected against
illegal search and seizure, Tehan has now apparently drawn a dis-
tinction between the various elements of the single right against
compulsory self-incrimination dependent solely upon what is per-
ceived to be the dominant purpose of the individual element of the
privilege in issue. It is submitted that in treating the no-comment
rule as unrelated to the reliability of the guilt-determining process
and in giving controlling weight to considerations of dominant ob-
jective, reliance and judicial efficiency, the Court in Tehan reached
an unwise result and in broadening the already doubtful base of
"0 See Mishkin, supra note 46, at 72-76.
" See Id. at 87.
"2 It would seem at least arguable that since across-the-board retroac-
tivity might stifle the development of new legal principles, some such basis
for line drawing is warranted.
"' Although Professor Mishkin agreed with the Linkletter result, he be-
lieved that Tehan required retroactive application.
Yet, though other factors may predominate, unless the court is willing
to treat the asserted purpose of assuring the reliability of the guilt-
determining process as insubstantial-which would seem virtually im-
possible in the face of Griffin v. California-the present requirements
would ... be applicable to all past convictions.
Id. at 94.
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Linkletter allowed practical considerations to overcome considera-
tions of justice and equality.
Fairness of trial would seem not to depend solely upon the ac-
curacy of the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence. As Miss
Mapp, Mr. Gideon and Mr. Griffin were deprived of certain elements
of the ritual to which we refer as a "fair trial," so also was Mr.
Tehan deprived. On this ground, there appears to be no distinc-
tion. Neither would a valid distinction between Mr. Gideon and
Mr. Tehan seem permissible on the ground of accuracy of verdict.
Consequently, the Tehan result appears to be based upon an
argument geared to support a preconceived decision against retro-
activity, pleaded as a purpose argument but actually sounding in
flooding the courts. In so extending the pragmatic approach, the
Court has apparently lost sight of the remaining relevance of the
theoretical approach based upon equality for persons similarly
situated, equal protection of the laws and the often crucial image
of judicial fairness.
How then do we reconcile the application of one constitutional
principle to pre-1965 criminal judgments with the application of a
different principle to post-1965 judgments? In Mr. Tehan's case,
we can do so neither upon the basis of precedent nor of sound
judicial policy.
ROBERT 0. KLEPFER, JR.
Corporations-1965 Amendment to the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act
The following comments concern the changes in the North
Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1955, Chapter 55 of the
General Statutes, made by the 1965 General Assembly.
I. INSPECTION RIGHTS
Section 55-38 was amended by adding a new provision blocking
shareholders of banks from inspecting "deposit records or loan rec-
ords of a bank customer, except upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction for good cause shown."' This enactment obviously re-
sponds to the effort in Cooke v. Outland2 to reach such records,
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 609, adding new subsection (i) to N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (1965).
265 N.C. 601, 144 S.E.2d 835 (1965).
1106 [Vol. 44
